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TRADE CREDIT, SOVEREIGN RISK AND MONETARY 
POLICY IN EUROPE 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this article is to analyze how sovereign risk influences the use of 
trade credit, both directly and through monetary policy. In addition, we test whether 
these effects differ during the crisis as compared to before the crisis. Using a sample of 
45,864 Eurozone firms (2005–2012), we find that trade credit received increases when 
sovereign risk becomes higher, but only before the crisis. However, during the crisis, 
trade credit supply decreases as sovereign risk increases. Additionally, monetary 
restrictions only lead to an increase in trade credit in low or moderate sovereign risk 
countries. 
Keywords: Trade credit; Sovereign risk; Monetary policy. 
JEL Classification: E44, E52, G32. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Monetary policy exerts its influence through several channels, which include the 
interest rate effects, exchange rate effects, other asset price effects, and the credit 
channel (Mishkin, 1995). The credit channel includes a mechanism called the trade 
credit channel, which highlights the importance of trade credit as an alternative source 
of funding. According to this channel, when monetary policy tightens and funding from 
financial institutions declines, firms increase their use of trade credit (Meltzer, 1960; 
Kohler et al., 2000; Nilsen, 2002; Mateut et al., 2006). In this context, the less 
financially vulnerable firms canalize sources of funding by extending trade credit to 
firms rationed by financial intermediaries. Thus, trade credit can be an important source 
of finance when there is shortage of bank credit, in that it helps in alleviating the 
financial constraints on firms. 
 Since the onset of the financial crisis, there has been a growing concern for the 
impact of sovereign risk on financial intermediaries, their balance sheets, and their 
ability to grant credit. Greater sovereign risk increases the cost and reduces the 
availability of some euro area bank funding, which leads to a sharp reduction in the 
supply of bank loans (CGFS, 2011; Bofondi et al., 2013; Albertazzi et al., 2014; 
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Cantero-Saiz, et al., 2014). This reduction in bank lending forces firms to look for 
alternative sources of finance, and trade credit is one of them. However, greater 
sovereign risk imposes severe financial restrictions on firms, increases the credit risk of 
firms and makes them maintain more precautionary liquidity, thus reducing their ability 
to extend and receive trade credit and leading to asymmetries in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism (Acharya et al., 2013; Broner et al., 2014). The analysis of this 
topic has important implications for the governments of each country, who need to take 
actions to mitigate the adverse effects of sovereign risk on national firms. Besides, it is 
useful for the European Central Bank, since the current context suggests that the single 
monetary policy, which has been in existence in Europe since 1999, is not affecting all 
the countries equally. Thus, it is necessary to understand how sovereign risk differences 
across countries determine the effects of monetary policy on trade credit. 
However, despite the far-reaching repercussions of this reality, not much research 
has been done on this issue, especially in Europe. This is because sovereign risk was not 
a major concern in the Eurozone until 2010, when the financial crisis was further 
aggravated following the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, the influence of 
sovereign risk on firms’ funding conditions and monetary policy transmission is a 
recent issue in Europe that requires special attention. Although several papers have 
analyzed the effects of monetary policy decisions on the use of trade credit1, they do not 
consider how these effects can be conditioned by the existence of sovereign risk. This 
fact explains why the main purpose of this article is to analyze how sovereign risk 
affects trade credit, both directly and through monetary policy. 
The sample for our empirical analysis comprises 45,864 firms from twelve 
Eurozone countries (the original eleven countries plus Greece) over the period 2005–
2012. The selection of these countries allows for analysis of the effects of sovereign risk 
on the trade credit channel, avoiding the bias caused by different monetary policies.  
The analysis was performed using the System-GMM methodology for panel data. 
This methodology allows for controlling both unobservable heterogeneity and the 
problems of endogeneity between trade credit and the characteristics of firms through 
the use of instruments. In addition, this methodology yields consistent and unbiased 
                                                          
1
 See, among others, Nadiri (1969); Nilsen (2002); Atanasova and Wilson (2003); Guariglia and Mateut 
(2006); Mateut et al. (2006) and Gama et al. (2014). 
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estimates of the relationships between the macroeconomic variables, firm-specific 
characteristics and trade credit. 
We analyzed trade credit from a double perspective. On one hand, we examined 
trade credit that firms receive from suppliers and, on the other hand, we studied trade 
credit that firms extend to customers. Our results reveal that trade credit received 
increases with the level of sovereign risk, but only before the crisis. However, during 
the crisis there is no evidence that greater sovereign risk increases trade credit received. 
In the years prior to the crisis, good financial conditions and low sovereign risk enabled 
firms to increase their access to trade credit. Nevertheless, after the onset of the crisis, 
sovereign risk and the probability of default of firms in the most affected countries 
sharply increased. This rendered suppliers reluctant to provide trade credit to those 
firms, and that explains why trade credit received cannot increase with the level of 
sovereign risk during the crisis.  
Concerning trade credit extended, it declines during the crisis as sovereign risk 
rises. Greater sovereign risk seriously affects the financial conditions of firms and 
makes them increase their precautionary liquidity, which is why they reduce the level of 
trade credit they provide to their customers.  
Additionally, a restrictive monetary policy only leads to an increase in trade credit 
in countries with low or moderate sovereign risk. In high sovereign risk countries, 
greater funding difficulties, high firms’ probability of default and credit contagion 
effects may outweigh the positive impact of monetary contractions on trade credit. 
Consequently, the results of this article provide three contributions to the existing 
literature. First, we determine how different levels of sovereign risk affect the use of 
trade credit by non-financial firms. Second, we test whether the effects of sovereign risk 
on trade credit differ during the crisis, as compared to those during the non-crisis years. 
Third, we show how sovereign risk determines the effects of monetary policy on trade 
credit through the trade credit channel.  
 The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
previous literature; Section 3 focuses on empirical analysis and discussion of the results; 
and Section 4 presents the conclusions. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Reasons that justify the existence of trade credit 
Trade credit is a short-term loan that a supplier provides to a customer in the form 
of delayed payment for their purchases and represents an important proportion of 
external funding for firms (Cuñat-Martinez and Garcia-Appendini, 2012)2. One 
essential aspect of trade credit is its two-way nature. Most firms, especially those at the 
intermediate point in the value chain, obtain trade credit from their suppliers and extend 
it to their customers. In consequence, trade credit represents an important component of 
both corporate liabilities and assets.  
There are several reasons that explain why some firms extend credit to their 
customers and receive credit from their suppliers. These reasons can be divided into two 
groups: the transaction motives and the financing motives (Mateut, 2005).  
The transaction motives consider trade credit as a part of firms’ operation cycle 
and justify its existence for several reasons. First, trade credit reduces transaction costs 
by making payments less frequent (Ferris, 1981), simplifying cash management for 
customers (Schwartz, 1974) and allowing suppliers to manage their inventory positions 
better (Emery, 1984; Long et al., 1993). Second, trade credit can also reduce the 
information asymmetries between the supplier and the customer by providing a quality 
guarantee. On one hand, suppliers can attest to the quality of their products by 
extending trade credit, so that the buyer can verify the quality of the product before 
payment (Long et al., 1993). On the other hand, specific terms such as early payment 
discounts can enable customers to reveal their credit quality through their payment 
practices (Smith, 1987). Third, trade credit allows for price discrimination between low-
quality and high-quality customers. In this regard, when anti-trust laws forbid direct 
price discrimination, high-priced trade credit can be a protection from low-quality 
customers, who will accept these trade credit conditions as they have no other financing 
alternatives (Brennan et al., 1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Fourth, trade credit 
contributes toward guaranteeing the survival and the loyalty of customers because, 
although suppliers do not favor risky clients, they consider the benefits of maintaining 
                                                          
2
 Trade credit represents more than 25% of total corporate assets in several European countries (Kohler et 
al., 2000; Guariglia and Mateut, 2006). 
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long-term relationships with clients in deciding to extend trade credit (Smith, 1987; 
Wilner, 2000). 
The financing motives postulate that suppliers have a financing advantage over 
other lenders in providing credit to their customers because of various reasons (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997; Ng et al., 1999; Mateut, 2005). First, the monitoring costs of the 
suppliers may be low, because they can acquire information about the creditworthiness 
of a buyer during the normal course of the commercial relationship. Second, the 
supplier may be in a better position to enforce repayment by threatening to cut off future 
supplies, especially if the buyer has few alternative sources for goods. Third, the 
supplier may be in a better position to repossess and resell the supplied goods. Finally, 
the suppliers may have superior knowledge of the market, so that they can better 
distinguish between a buyer in financial trouble and a market in decline. 
2.2. The trade credit channel of monetary policy 
The importance of trade credit as a source of finance has formed the foundation 
for the monetary policy transmission mechanism, called the trade credit channel. This 
channel postulates that, during monetary restrictions, firms increase their use of trade 
credit to offset the contraction in lending by financial intermediaries. In this context, the 
firms with better access to bank funding and capital markets, and hence being less 
vulnerable to monetary shocks, redistribute their finance by extending trade credit to 
more vulnerable firms (Meltzer, 1960). Thus, trade credit is a substitute source of 
funding for bank loans when credit institutions curtail lending. 
Trade credit is considered more expensive than bank credit, especially when 
customers do not use the early payment discount (Petersen and Rajan, 1997)3, which is 
why trade credit is a less desirable alternative to corporate finance coming behind bank 
credit in the financing pecking order (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Even so, the trade 
credit channel assumes that its cost is relatively more stable over time (Ng et al., 1999). 
Thus, when monetary restrictions curtail bank lending, and the effective cost of bank 
finance increases, trade credit becomes relatively cheaper for some firms, and may even 
be their only source of funding available. As a result, credit rationed firms resort to 
trade credit to offset the decline in bank lending and the higher costs involved in 
                                                          
3
 Cuñat-Martinez (2007) considers that trade credit is costlier, even if there are no early payment 
discounts, because suppliers get a premium for providing credit when banks are not willing to lend. 
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accessing it. In contrast, when monetary policy is expansionary, the cost of bank finance 
remains lower than the cost of trade credit, and hence firms prefer to use bank loans, 
instead of trade credit, for finance (see Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Several studies confirm this relationship between trade credit and bank loans. 
Nadiri (1969) finds that trade credits extended and received increase during monetary 
contractions in the United States (US), while net trade credit (the difference between 
trade credits extended and received) does not vary. Schwartz (1974) also shows that 
monetary restrictions in the US increase the use of trade credit, mainly for small firms, 
while large firms tend to grant more trade credit. However, Nilsen (2002) reports that 
firm size does not influence the use of trade credit when there is restrictive monetary 
policy. Only American firms with bond rating are able to access bank funding and 
capital markets during monetary shocks, thus avoiding the more expensive trade credit 
financing.  
As far as the empirical evidence in Europe is concerned, Mateut and Mizen (2002) 
show that monetary restrictions in the United Kingdom lead to a reduction in bank loans 
and to an increase in the use of trade credit, especially for small, young and risky firms. 
Mateut et al. (2006) report similar results, but also they find that monetary expansions 
produce an increase in bank lending and a reduction in trade credit4. In addition, 
Valderrama (2003) shows that the use of trade credit as an alternative source of funding 
to bank loans mitigates the impact of monetary shocks in Austria. More recently, Gama 
et al. (2014) show that small and medium-sized firms in Portugal use more trade credit 
to overcome their difficulties in accessing bank loans5. 
2.3. Trade credit and sovereign risk 
The financial crisis that erupted in 2008 caused a sharp deterioration in the public 
finances of several European countries, raising investor concerns about sovereign risk. 
Greater sovereign risk had a serious impact on financial intermediaries, which worsened 
                                                          
4
 Other studies also find that monetary contractions push up the use of trade credit in the United Kingdom 
(Kohler et al., 2000; Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; Guariglia and Mateut, 2006). 
5
 Although trade credit is an alternative source of finance to bank lending, it may also help credit-
constrained firms to access loans because suppliers have private information on their customers that they 
can pass on to bank lenders  (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Agostino and Trivieri, 
2014). 
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their financing conditions through several mechanisms (CGFS, 2011). First, the increase 
in sovereign risk reduced the value of banks’ holdings of sovereign debt, which 
damaged their balance sheets and thus restricted their access to funding. Second, greater 
sovereign risk decreased the value of the collateral that banks can use to obtain funding 
in the wholesale markets. Third, sovereign rating downgrades were followed by 
downgrades in the domestic bank ratings, which resulted in increasing their risk and 
making funding more difficult and expensive. Fourth, sovereign risk deterioration 
decreased the benefits that systemic banks obtain from government guarantees, and thus 
increased their financing costs. These funding problems for banks in high sovereign risk 
countries restricted the supply and increased the cost of bank credit6. 
This reduction in lending has important implications, since bank credit is the main 
source of external funding for the non-financial private sector in the Eurozone. Thus, 
the impact of sovereign risk on banks will also significantly affect the financing 
conditions of firms. In this context, the reduction in bank loans and their increased cost 
force firms to resort to trade credit as an alternative source of funding (Santos et al., 
2012; Coulibaly et al., 2013; Casey and O´Toole, 2014; Carbó-Valverde et al., 2016). 
However, the effectiveness of trade credit as a substitute for bank loans can be reduced 
in periods of strong global crises and credit crunch problems, since all firms suffer 
severe financial restrictions that impede the redistribution of resources through trade 
credit to offset the reduction in bank loans (Love et al., 2007; Love and Zaidi, 2010; 
Kestens et al., 2012; Psillaki and Eleftheriou, 2015; Lin and Chou, 2015). In this regard, 
several reasons can explain why trade credit cannot be an effective substitute for bank 
credit in countries with high sovereign risk. 
First, apart from bank markets, sovereign risk has also led to disruption in other 
sources of funding, such as the capital markets. Yields on government bonds usually act 
as a benchmark for bonds issued by firms. Thus, high yields in government bonds, due 
to high sovereign risk, will sharply increase the cost of corporate bonds (Fostel and 
Kaminsky, 2007; Cavallo and Valenzuela, 2010; Diaz et al., 2013; Pianeselli and 
Zaghini, 2014). In this context, traditional trade credit suppliers will have more 
difficulties in canalizing sources of funding to their customers. 
                                                          
6
 Several empirical studies have found that sovereign risk has reduced loan supply by increasing the 
funding costs of banks (Bofondi et al., 2013; Albertazzi et al., 2014; Cantero-Saiz, et al., 2014). 
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Second, greater sovereign risk, due to rising public debt, also implies higher 
financing needs for the public sector. This is especially relevant during the current 
crisis, since the costs of default are higher than ever, which forces heavily indebted 
countries to assume unsustainable debt obligations (Bolton, 2016). These unsustainable 
debt levels increase more sharply the funding requirements of the public sector and, 
hence, there is a risk of the crowding-out of private investment (ECB, 2010). The 
crowding-out effect implies that, when fiscal deficit is high, the public sector has to 
compete with the private sector to obtain funding7. Due to this fact, the crowding-out 
effect caused by a high level of public debt and greater sovereign risk will worsen the 
financial conditions of national firms, thus reducing their ability to extend trade credit 
(Agca and Celasun, 2012; Broner et al., 2014). 
Third, an increase in sovereign risk is associated with a robust increase in the 
credit risk, and hence the probability of default by non-financial firms (Durbin and Ng, 
2005; Borenzstein et al., 2013; Klein and Stellner, 2014). This is because downgrades in 
sovereign ratings lead to a reduction in national firms’ ratings and also because 
governments’ financial difficulties imply important changes in the economic situation 
of the country, which can negatively affect firms’ creditworthiness (Ferri et al., 2001; 
Peter and Grandes, 2005; Arteta and Hale, 2008). This higher credit risk, caused by 
sovereign risk, will increase the probability of default by national firms, which will be 
transmitted to those firms that have trade credit receivables from the defaulting firms, 
causing a domino effect (Boissay, 2006)8. In this scenario of firms’ creditworthiness 
deterioration and credit risk contagion, firms will be more reluctant to grant trade credit 
and will also have more difficulty in accessing it (Love and Zaidi, 2010; Bastos and 
Pindado, 2013; Tsuruta, 2013).  
Finally, firms will tend to increase their cash reserves to deal with the huge credit 
shortage and the funding uncertainties caused by high sovereign risk (Opler et al., 1999; 
Campello, et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2013). This liquidity hoarding will reduce the 
supply of trade credit. 
                                                          
7
 The crowding-out effect of private investment by public investment has been widely analyzed (see, 
among others, Frankel, 1986; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
8
 Jacobson and Schedvin (2015) show that trade credit losses are one of the main channels in the 
propagation of corporate failures. 
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Not only do the severe financial restrictions caused by sovereign risk affect trade 
credit directly, but they also impede the functioning of the trade credit channel of 
monetary policy. According to the trade credit channel, a restrictive monetary policy 
leads to an increase in the use of trade credit to offset the contraction in bank lending. In 
this context, firms that are less vulnerable to bank lending restrictions and more capable 
of accessing capital markets, act as funding conduits to their financially constrained 
clients by extending trade credit (Meltzer, 1960; Nilsen, 2002). However, trade credit 
cannot increase during monetary restrictions in countries with high sovereign risk, 
since, as we mentioned previously, national firms suffer greater funding difficulties, 
have more credit risk, and higher liquidity hoarding (Campello et al., 2010; Agca and 
Celasun, 2012; Klein and Stellner, 2014).  
Therefore, we propose that an increase in sovereign risk will lead to a reduction in 
the volume of trade credit. In addition, the increase in the volume of trade credit, caused 
by monetary restrictions, will be less pronounced in countries with higher sovereign 
risk. 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Selection of the sample 
We used a sample of medium and big firms9 from twelve Eurozone countries10 
during the period 2005 to 2012. These countries were selected so as to allow analysis of 
the effect of sovereign risk on the trade credit channel of monetary policy, avoiding the 
bias caused by different monetary policies. We included non-financial firms, which 
belong to 8 industries whose two-digit code sector is between 11 and 49, according to 
the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System)11. We removed those 
firms that fulfil some of the following requirements (Ferrando and Mulier, 2013; 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013): (1) Firms with negative values for 
total assets, trade credit, sales, tangible fixed assets, bank loans, inventories or cash; (2) 
Firms whose ratio of tangible fixed assets, bank loans, inventories, cash or internal 
                                                          
9
 According to the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC), the category 
of medium- and big-sized firms comprises firms that employ more than 50 persons and have an annual 
turnover of more than €10 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total of more than €10 million. 
10
 Our sample comprises the original eleven countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) plus Greece. 
11
 NAICS industries, whose two-digit code is between 11 and 49, include the following: Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing and Hunting; Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction; Utilities; Construction; 
Manufacturing; Trade; Transportation and Warehousing. 
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resources over total assets are greater than 100% or lower than -100%; and (3) Firms 
whose sales variation is greater than 100% in a year. 
Since we used the System-GMM methodology for panel data and calculated the 
growth rates of several variables, we only analyzed those firms for which data was 
available for a minimum of five consecutive years between 2005 and 2012. This 
condition is essential to test for second-order serial correlation, which is performed to 
ensure the robustness of the estimates made by System-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). 
Table 1 shows the number of firms and observations from each country and the 
number of observations per year. Table 2 depicts the industry breakdown for the 
sample. The financial information on each firm was taken from the Amadeus database. 
The macroeconomic information was taken from the World Development Indicators 
database of the World Bank, OECD statistics, and EuroStat. 
[Insert Tables 1 & 2] 
3.2. Econometric model and data 
To test the hypotheses, we propose the following model, based on the approach of 
previous papers to trade credit (Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; Love et al., 2007; Kestens 
et al., 2012). These studies regress trade credit variables on a group of control variables 
and monetary policy indicators. We contribute to these empirical models by adding 
sovereign risk variables and their interactions with the monetary policy indicators. 
, =  + 
, + (+	,) ∗ , + , + ∑

  +
	∑



  !"#$% + ∑&

' (&)#*"+$%& + ,,  (1) 
In model (1), trade credit (TC) is the dependent variable. We used two measures 
of trade credit: trade credit payables and trade credit receivables. Trade credit payables 
(TCPAY) show the volume of trade credit that firms obtain from suppliers. It is the ratio 
of accounts payable to total sales. Trade credit receivables (TCREC) represent the 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
11 
 
amount of trade credit that firms provide to customers. It is measured by the level of 
accounts receivables over total sales12.  
SR is the sovereign risk, measured as sovereign risk premium: the sovereign bond 
yield spread of a country relative to that of Germany (Codogno et al., 2003; Bernoth and 
Wolff, 2008; Bernoth et al., 2012; Cantero-Saiz, et al., 2014). Sovereign bond yield 
spread is widely used to measure sovereign risk, because it captures the country’s credit 
risk (probability of sovereign default) and liquidity risk. We expressed SR as a dummy 
variable to control for high and low sovereign risk countries. According to Bessler and 
Wolff (2014), sovereign risk is high when the risk premium of a country relative to that 
of Germany is larger than 100 basis points. Thus, the variable SR takes the value of 1 
when it is greater than 100 basis points and 0 otherwise. In previous sections, we have 
postulated that an increase in sovereign risk leads to a reduction in trade credit. Thus, 
we expect a negative relationship between sovereign risk and trade credit.  
The monetary policy indicator ∆i is measured by the change in the short-term 
money market rate (Ehrmann et al., 2003; Altunbas et al., 2010; Olivero et al., 2011). 
To analyze if the effects of monetary policy on trade credit differ between low and high 
sovereign risk countries, we included interaction terms between the monetary policy 
indicator and the sovereign risk variable (SRt*∆it). The effects of monetary policy on 
trade credit when sovereign risk is low (SR dummy = 0) are measured by the coefficient 
α2, while the effects when sovereign risk is high (SR dummy = 1) are reflected by the 
sum of the coefficients α2 + α3. We expect that the coefficient α2 will have a significant 
and positive sign and the sum of the coefficients α2 + α3 a negative one, since 
previously we have postulated that the increase in trade credit, caused by a monetary 
restriction, is less pronounced in countries with higher sovereign risk.  
Finally, Xi,t is a vector of control variables, which consists of variables frequently 
encountered in empirical literature on trade credit. All these control variables and their 
expected relationship with trade credit payables and trade credit receivables are 
explained below.  
                                                          
12
 By scaling the two measures of trade credit by sales, we control for declines in economic activity, 
which are commonly associated with crises (Love et al., 2007; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 
2013). 
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∆SALES is the growth rate in sales from firm i in year t, relative to year t-1. Firms 
with higher sales growth are perceived as fast growing clients by their suppliers and this 
will induce them to provide more trade credit (Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; Molina and 
Preve, 2012). Hence, we expect a positive relationship between sales growth and trade 
credit payables. As regards trade credit receivables, firms with low sales growth may 
use the extension of trade credit to boost their sales (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Thus, 
we expect a negative relationship between sales growth and trade credit receivables. 
SIZE is the log of total assets. Larger firms have better access to bank and capital 
markets; so, they can avoid more expensive trade credit financing (Kestens et al., 2012; 
Molina and Preve, 2012). Hence, we expect a negative relationship between size and 
trade credit payables. As regards trade credit receivables, larger firms have fewer 
financial constraints and are, therefore, considered more creditworthy than their smaller 
counterparts. Consequently, we can expect a positive relationship between size and 
trade credit receivables (Schwartz, 1974). However, as trade credit can serve as a signal 
of product quality and firm reputation, large firms with a better reputation in the market 
do not need to show additional quality signals and thus, they provide less trade credit 
(Deloof and Jegers, 1996). However, smaller firms, whose reputation is usually much 
less, remain more willing to offer trade credit to their customers to boost their sales 
(Long et al., 1993). As a result, the relationship between size and trade credit 
receivables may also be negative. 
LIQ is defined as the ratio of cash balances to total assets. Firms with liquidity 
problems are supposed to have a higher need for trade credit financing (Kohler et al., 
2000). Consequently, we can expect a negative relationship between liquidity and trade 
credit payables. However, suppliers may be reluctant to offer trade credit to illiquid 
firms; so, a positive relationship can also be possible (Kestens et al., 2012). As regards 
trade credit receivables, more liquid firms are expected to be more capable of providing 
trade credit to their customers. Thus, a positive relationship can be expected between 
liquidity and trade receivables (Ng et al., 1999; Love et al., 2007). On the other hand, 
firms may be unwilling to extend trade credit to customers if firms pursue a higher 
liquidity goal (Bougheas et al., 2009); thus, we could also have a negative relationship 
between liquidity and trade credit receivables. 
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INV is the ratio of inventory to total assets. Suppliers will provide more trade 
credit to firms with bigger inventory, because in case of bankruptcy, the inventory can 
usually be liquidated easily (Taketa and Udell, 2007). In consequence, we can expect a 
positive relationship between inventory and trade credit payables. Concerning trade 
credit receivables, firms with large inventories of finished goods bear high storage 
costs. To avoid these storage costs, they may boost sales by extending trade credit to 
their customers (Bougheas et al., 2009). Based on this assumption, we expect a positive 
relationship between inventory and trade credit receivables. On the contrary, we could 
also find a negative relationship, since both inventories and accounts receivables are 
current assets and, hence, are substitutes from an asset management perspective (Choi 
and Kim, 2005). 
INTRES are calculated as the ratio of cash flow to total assets. The pecking order 
theory postulates that firms with more internally generated resources prefer to use them 
to finance their activities instead of using costlier external funding (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). Thus, we expect a negative relationship between internally generated resources 
and trade credit payables. Concerning trade credit receivables, firms that generate more 
cash internally have more resources to offer trade credit to their customers (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997; Biais and Gollier, 1997). Hence, we can expect a positive relationship 
between internally generated resources and trade credit receivables. 
COL is the ratio of tangible fixed assets over total assets, and it is a determinant of 
trade credit payables. Firms with fewer collateralizable assets use more trade credit, 
because they cannot borrow enough from banks (Tsuruta, 2013). Hence, we expect a 
negative relationship between collateral and trade credit payables. 
LOANS is the ratio of bank loans over total assets. Firms with poor access to bank 
financing tend to rely more on trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Thus, we expect 
a negative relationship between bank loans and trade credit payables. As regards trade 
credit receivables, better access to bank loans allows firms to extend more trade credit 
to their customers (Meltzer, 1960; Nilsen, 2002). Consequently, we expect a positive 
relationship between bank loans and trade credit receivables. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the independent variables included in Equation 
(1). 
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[Insert Table 3] 
Country, year, and industry dummies were included to capture country, year, and 
industry-specific factors. The error term is ,,; i = 1,2,…, N indicates a specific firm i; 
m = 1,2,…, M indicates a particular country m; t = 1,2,…, T indicates a particular year t; 
s = 1,2,…, S indicates a specific industry s and j denotes the number of lags. 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
Table 5 shows the correlations between variables to identify potential collinearity 
problems between variables. 
[Insert Tables 4 & 5] 
3.3. Methodology 
The model in Equation (1) was estimated using two steps System-GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments), which is consistent with the presence of any pattern 
of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. This method allows for controlling the 
problems of endogeneity, besides allowing us to obtain consistent and unbiased 
estimates by using lagged independent variables as instruments (Arellano and Bond, 
1991)13. The monetary policy indicator and the macroeconomic variables are considered 
exogenous, while firm-specific characteristics are considered endogenous (Jimborean, 
2009). The exogenous variables were instrumented by themselves. For the endogenous 
variables, we followed the approach of Keasey et al. (2015) and used as instruments a 
number of lags that satisfy both exogeneity and strength. To choose the best 
instruments, we first used the following set of instrumental variables: for the equations 
in differences we initially considered from t – 2 to t – 6 lags and for the equations in 
levels from t – 2 to t – 4 lags14. To analyze the exogeneity of these instrumental 
variables, we ran a difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity for this subset of 
instruments, under the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. In this 
regard, we deleted from the instrument set all the instruments that are not exogenous. 
Table 6 shows the results of this estimation. 
                                                          
13
 The System-GMM estimator can provide stronger instruments and lower bias, since it considers both 
first-differenced and levels equations (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bonaimé et al., 2014; Keasey et al., 
2015).  
14
 Wintoki et al. (2012) also considered a maximum of t – 6 and t – 4 lags for the equations in differences 
and in levels respectively. 
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[Insert Table 6] 
First, column 3 in Table 6 shows the difference-in-Hansen test of the exogeneity 
of the instruments for the equations in differences (when the instruments are in levels). 
For instance, we used as instruments for the variable ∆SALES its lags in t – 4 and t – 5 
(here we do not reject the null hypothesis, p-values = 0.433 and 0.071, respectively), 
since the lags from t – 2, t – 3 and t – 6 are not exogenous (here we do reject the null 
hypothesis, all p-values = 0.000). Second, column 4 depicts the difference-in-Hansen 
test of exogeneity of the instruments for the equations in levels (when the instruments 
are in differences). For example, we used as instruments for the variable SIZE its lag in t 
– 4, since they are exogenous when lagged four periods (p-value = 0.465), but not for 
the rest of the periods (p-values = 0.000 and 0.006 in t – 2 and t – 3 respectively). For 
the rest of the variables, we proceeded in the same way (see Table 6). 
We also analyzed the strength of the instruments through two additional tests 
(Wintoki et al., 2012; Keasey et al., 2015). In the first test, we studied each endogenous 
variable separately to assess whether the instruments provide significant explanatory 
power over the endogenous variables, focusing on the F-statistics from the first-stage 
OLS regressions. We ran two different regressions for each endogenous variable: one 
for the equations in differences (where the instruments are in levels), and the other for 
the equations in levels (where the instruments are in differences). In the second test we 
calculated the Cragg-Donald statistics from a two-stage OLS regression for the 
equations in differences and for the equations in levels respectively. This is a joint test, 
which is more informative than the F-statistics when there is more than one endogenous 
variable. 
Table 7 shows the results of this analysis. The F-statistics for all the first-stage 
regressions are significant and higher than 10, which is the critical value suggested by 
Staiger and Stock (1997). It implies that the instruments provide significant explanatory 
power for the endogenous variables. Finally, we examined the Cragg-Donald statistics. 
To calculate these statistics we used 16 instruments for the equations in levels and 19 
for the equations in differences. For the equations in levels, the Cragg-Donald statistic is 
17.60. This value exceeds all the critical values from Table 5.1 of Stock and Yogo 
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(2005) for a bias lower than 10% when the number of instruments (K) is equal to 1615. 
Thus, with this Cragg-Donald statistic, we can confirm that the bias from using these 
instruments in the equations in levels is less than 10% of the bias from an OLS 
regression, at the 5% level of significance. For the equations in differences, the Cragg-
Donald statistic is 3.50. This value is similar to the one that Keasey et al. (2015) 
consider acceptable for confirming that the bias of using the instruments is less than 
30% of the bias from an OLS regression, at the 5% level of significance. 
[Insert Table 7] 
3.4. Empirical results 
The results of the empirical specification are divided into two parts according to 
the way of measuring sovereign risk (SR). On one hand, we have considered sovereign 
risk as a dummy variable that can adopt two possible values (0 if SR is low and 1 if SR 
is high)16, while on the other hand, we have considered sovereign risk as a continuous 
variable and, hence, it can adopt infinite values. 
3.4.1. Sovereign risk (SR) as a dummy variable 
Table 8 shows the results when sovereign risk (SR) is a dummy variable. In model 
(a) we analyzed trade credit payables (TCPAY). The variable SR is significant with a 
negative coefficient. Thus, firms in high sovereign risk countries receive less trade 
credit as we proposed. Firms that operate in higher sovereign risk countries have greater 
credit risk that can be transmitted to their potential suppliers, which is why these 
suppliers are more reluctant to provide credit to those firms.  
[Insert Table 8] 
The variable ∆i, which measures the effects of monetary policy on trade credit 
payables when sovereign risk is low (SR = 0), has a significant and positive coefficient. 
Therefore, an increase in the short-term money market rate leads to an increase in trade 
credit received, as the trade credit channel suggests. The interaction term between 
monetary policy and sovereign risk (∆it*SRt) is significant and negative, so the effects 
                                                          
15
 Stock and Yogo (2005) developed a set of critical values for evaluating the strength or weakness of 
instruments for models containing up to three endogenous variables. 
16
 As we mentioned previously, sovereign risk is high (SR dummy = 1) when the risk premium of a 
country relative to that of Germany is greater than 100 basis points (Bessler and Wolff, 2014). 
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of monetary policy on trade credit payables when sovereign risk is high (SR = 1) are 
statistically significantly different from the effects when sovereign risk is low (SR = 0). 
Thus, we need to carry out the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficient 
associated with ∆it and the coefficient associated with the interaction between ∆it and 
SRt (represented in Table 8 by LR Test. SR). LR Test. SR, which measures the effects of 
monetary policy on trade credit received when sovereign risk is high (SR = 1), is not 
significant. Thus, the positive and significant effect of monetary restrictions on trade 
credit payables reported when sovereign risk is low (SR = 0), disappears when 
sovereign risk is high (SR = 1). This result can be due to the fact that in high sovereign 
risk countries, greater funding difficulties, high firms’ probability of default, and credit 
contagion effects outweigh the positive impact of monetary contractions on trade credit 
received. 
In Table 8, model (b), we analyzed trade credit receivables (TCREC). The variable 
SR is negative and significant, so firms in high sovereign risk countries extend less trade 
credit as we proposed. High sovereign risk seriously damages the financial conditions of 
firms and makes them increase precautionary liquidity, which is why they provide less 
credit. 
The variable ∆i, which measures the effects of monetary policy on trade credit 
supply in low sovereign risk countries (SR = 0), is positive and significant. It implies 
that monetary restrictions increase the provision of trade credit as the trade credit 
channel postulates. The interaction term between monetary policy and sovereign risk 
(∆it*SRt) has a significant and negative coefficient, so the effects of monetary policy on 
trade credit receivables in high sovereign risk countries (SR = 1) differ significantly 
from the effects in low sovereign risk countries (SR = 0). If we consider the linear 
restriction test LR Test. SR, which measures the effects of monetary policy on trade 
credit supply when sovereign risk is high (SR = 1), it is not significant. It means that, 
during monetary restrictions, trade credit provision does not increase in high sovereign 
risk countries. Similar to trade credit received in model (a), the severe financial 
restrictions caused by sovereign risk have offset the positive effects of monetary 
contractions on trade credit supply. 
Regarding the control variables, the variable ∆SALES is negative and significant, 
so firms with lower sales growth extend more trade credit, probably to boost sales 
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(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). The variable SIZE has a significant and positive coefficient, 
and hence, larger firms provide more trade credit (Schwartz, 1974). Finally, the 
variables LIQ and COL are negative and significant (Bougheas et al., 2009). 
3.4.2. Sovereign risk (SR) as a continuous variable 
In the previous section, we analyzed the trade credit channel in low and high 
sovereign risk countries, by using a sovereign risk dummy that is equal to 1 when the 
risk premium is larger than 100 basis points and 0 otherwise. We reported that high 
sovereign risk makes trade credit decline, thus offsetting the positive effects of 
monetary restrictions on this credit. To analyze more exactly at which level of sovereign 
risk trade credit starts to decline, we included the continuous variable of sovereign risk 
(SR)17. Table 9 shows the results of this analysis.  
[Insert Table 9] 
In model (a), we analyzed trade credit payables (TCPAY). The variable of 
sovereign risk (SR) is not significant. The coefficient associated with the monetary 
policy indicator (∆i), which captures the effect of monetary policy changes on trade 
credit payables when sovereign risk is zero, is positive and statistically significant, so 
higher interest rates lead to an increase in trade credit payables as we reported 
previously. In this analysis, we included the interaction between monetary policy and 
the sovereign risk variable (∆i*SR), which are continuous. Because of the interaction 
between two continuous variables, the significance and marginal effect of monetary 
policy on trade credit payables will depend on the value of sovereign risk (SR). To 
capture this marginal effect, we have to take the first derivative of Equation (1) with 
respect to monetary policy: 
-./0,1
2345,1
=  + ,        (1.1) 
 The coefficient α2 denotes the marginal effect of monetary policy on trade credit 
payables when sovereign risk (SR) is zero. α2 + α3 denote the marginal effect of 
monetary policy on trade credit payables at one specific point (when sovereign risk (SR) 
                                                          
17
 The dummy variable SR considers two groups of countries according to their level of sovereign risk 
(low if SR = 0 and high if SR = 1), but without considering the different values of sovereign risk within 
the same group of countries. The inclusion of the continuous variable SR complements the previous 
analysis, since it considers all the possible values that SR can adopt. Therefore, it allows analysis of how 
the marginal effects of monetary policy on trade credit vary depending on the value of SR. 
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has a value of 1). Since sovereign risk (SR) is a continuous variable and, hence, can 
adopt infinite values, the marginal effect in Equation (1.1) changes with the level of 
sovereign risk; so, we need to use plots to interpret the results properly18.  
Figure 2 reports the marginal effect of monetary policy on the level of trade credit 
payables in relation to risk premium when there is an increase in the short-term money 
market rate (a restrictive monetary policy). The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence interval19. Confidence intervals of 90% allow us to determine the conditions 
under which the monetary policy indicator has a statistically significant effect on trade 
credit payables (whenever both upper and lower bounds of the 90% confidence interval 
are either above or below zero). 
[Insert Figure 2] 
According to the results of Figure 2, an increase in the short-term money market 
rate leads to an increase in the volume of trade credit received in countries with a not 
very high risk premium. In this regard, the marginal effect on trade payables is similar 
(between 0.0144 and 0.0100) in all the countries whose risk premium is lower than 
4.07%20. Beyond this point, the marginal effect is not significant; so, there is no 
evidence in our sample that firms in high sovereign risk countries increase trade credit 
received during monetary restrictions. All firms in these countries have high credit risk 
that can be transmitted to their suppliers, which may outweigh the increase in trade 
credit received caused by monetary contractions. 
As regards the control variables, the variable INTRES is significant with a 
negative coefficient, so firms that generate more internal resources prefer to use them to 
finance their investment activities and reduce the use of trade credit (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). 
In Table 9, model (b), we analyzed trade credit receivables (TCREC). Sovereign 
risk (SR) is negative and statistically significant, so greater sovereign risk leads to a 
reduction in trade credit receivables as we reported previously. Besides, monetary 
policy (∆i) is significant with a positive coefficient, which means that monetary 
                                                          
18
 The interpretation of the interaction of continuous variables is thoroughly explained in Brambor et al. 
(2006) and Berry et al. (2012). 
19
 We followed Aiken and West (1991) to compute the confidence intervals. 
20
 This comprises all the countries of the sample except for Greece since 2010, Ireland and Portugal since 
2011, and Spain in 2012. 
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contractions produce an increase in the supply of trade credit when sovereign risk (SR) 
is zero. Regarding the interaction between monetary policy and sovereign risk (∆i*SR) 
in model (b), since we are dealing with the interaction of two continuous variables 
(monetary policy and sovereign risk), the marginal effect of monetary policy on trade 
credit receivables will depend on the value of sovereign risk. To capture this marginal 
effect, we have to take the derivative of Equation (1) with respect to monetary policy, as 
reported in Equation (1.1), and construct plots to interpret the results properly.  
Figure 3 represents the marginal effect of monetary policy on trade credit supply 
in relation to the risk premium when there is an increase in the short-term money market 
rate. When the interest rate in the money market increases, trade credit receivables 
increase in countries with a risk premium lower than 0.27%21. The marginal effect is 
similar in all these countries (between 0.0149 and 0.0120). However, beyond this level 
of risk premium, there is no evidence in our sample that monetary restrictions lead to an 
increase in trade credit extended. Firms in higher sovereign risk countries face serious 
financial constraints and maintain more precautionary liquidity, which offsets the 
increase in trade credit supply caused by monetary contractions.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
Concerning the signs and significance of the control variables, they are similar to 
those obtained in previous models. 
Finally, we controlled for the existence of structural breaks by interacting the 
sovereign risk indicator (SR) with a PRECRISIS dummy. This dummy takes the value of 
1 from 2005 to 2007 and 0 otherwise. Therefore, it represents the years before the 
outbreak of the crisis22. Table 10 shows the results of this analysis.   
[Insert Table 10] 
In Table 10, model (a), we examined trade credit payables (TCPAY). The variable 
sovereign risk (SR), which represents the influence of sovereign risk on trade credit 
                                                          
21
 Most of the countries of the sample have a risk premium below this level before the crisis, but during 
the crisis years, only Germany has a risk premium lower than this level during the whole period, while the 
risk premium of France, the Netherlands and Finland is below this level in some crisis years. 
22
 The sovereign risk dummy (SR), used in the analysis of Table 8, and the PRECRISIS dummy present 
collinearity problems, since the years after the outbreak of the crisis (PRECRISIS = 0) are exactly those 
when sovereign risk is high (SR = 1). Therefore, it is not possible to include the interaction between the 
sovereign risk dummy (SR) and the PRECRISIS dummy in the analysis of Table 8. 
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received during the crisis (when PRECRISIS = 0), is not significant. Thus, in this model 
(a) we do not have evidence that sovereign risk affects trade credit payables after the 
outbreak of the crisis. The interaction between the variable SR and PRECRISIS is 
positive and significant. It means that the effects of sovereign risk on trade credit 
payables before the crisis (PRECRISIS = 1) are statistically significantly different from 
those during the crisis (PRECRISIS = 0). Therefore, we need to carry out the linear 
restriction test of the sum of the coefficient associated with SRt and the coefficient 
associated with the interaction between SRt and PRECRISISt (represented in Table 10 by 
LR Test. PRECRISIS). LR Test. PRECRISIS, which measures the effects of sovereign 
risk on trade credit received before the crisis (PRECRISIS = 1), is positive and 
statistically significant. Hence, before the crisis greater sovereign risk produces an 
increase in trade credit payables. It is possible that before the crisis, since credit 
conditions were better and sovereign risk was very low in all the Eurozone countries, 
firms were able to get more trade credit financing from their suppliers. However, after 
the outbreak of the financial crisis, sovereign risk increased sharply, which damaged the 
creditworthiness of national firms, thus making their suppliers more reluctant to provide 
trade credit to them. This fact would explain why trade payables do not increase during 
the crisis when sovereign risk is higher. Thus, similar to previous models, these results 
show that high sovereign risk deteriorates the availability of trade credit for firms. 
Regarding the effects of monetary policy in Table 10, model (a), since we are 
dealing with the interaction of two continuous variables (monetary policy and sovereign 
risk), the marginal effect of monetary policy on trade credit payables will depend on the 
value of sovereign risk. To capture this marginal effect, we have to take the derivative 
of Equation (1) with respect to monetary policy, as reported in Equation (1.1), and 
construct plots to interpret the results properly. These results, which are shown in Figure 
4, are similar to those reported previously.  
[Insert Figure 4] 
Concerning the signs and significance of the control variables, they are similar to 
those obtained in previous models. 
In Table 10, model (b), we analyzed trade credit receivables (TCREC). The 
variable SR, which denotes the effects of sovereign risk on trade credit receivables 
during the crisis (PRECRISIS = 0), is negative and significant, so greater sovereign risk 
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leads to a reduction in trade credit supply after the outbreak of the crisis, as we reported 
previously. The interaction between SR and the PRECRISIS dummy (SRt*PRECRISISt) 
is not significant, so the effects of sovereign risk on trade credit supply before the crisis 
(PRECRISIS = 1) are not significantly different from those during the crisis 
(PRECRISIS = 0). 
Concerning monetary policy and its interactions with sovereign risk, we have to 
take the first derivative of Equation (1), as was done in Equation (1.1), and construct 
plots to show the results. Figure 5 represents the marginal effect of monetary policy on 
trade credit receivables in relation to the risk premium when there is an increase in the 
short-term money market rate. These results are similar to those reported previously. 
[Insert Figure 5] 
As regards the signs and significance of the control variables, they are similar to 
those reported in previous models. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The financial crisis that started in 2008 raised investor concerns about sovereign 
risk in several European countries. Greater sovereign risk worsened the financing 
conditions of the banking sector, leading to a sharp decrease in the supply of loans. The 
reduction in bank lending has seriously affected the financial conditions of non-
financial firms, which has forced them to resort to trade credit as an alternative source 
of finance. This paper analyses how sovereign risk affects the volume of trade credit, 
both directly and through monetary policy. Greater sovereign risk has imposed severe 
financial restrictions on all firms and has forced them to maintain more precautionary 
liquidity. In addition, greater sovereign risk has increased the probability of default of 
national firms, raising concerns about credit contagion effects. Because of these 
problems, we contend that firms will be more reluctant to provide trade credit and will 
have more difficulties in accessing this source of finance. Consequently, sovereign risk 
will lead to a reduction in trade credit, thus limiting the positive effects of monetary 
restrictions on it. 
Using a sample of European firms from 2005 to 2012, we find that sovereign risk 
plays an important role in determining the volume of trade credit in the Eurozone. Trade 
credit received increases with an increase in sovereign risk, but only in the years prior to 
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the crisis. However, during the crisis, there is no evidence that trade credit received 
increases with the level of sovereign risk. Regarding trade credit supply, it decreases 
during the crisis as sovereign risk increases. Additionally, we find that monetary 
restrictions only lead to an increase in trade credit in countries with low or moderate 
sovereign risk.   
These results would be very helpful to euro area governments in taking actions to 
mitigate the adverse effects of sovereign risk on national firms. In addition, these results 
are very interesting in the context of the manner in which monetary policy is being 
conducted by the European Central Bank. The results suggest that the single monetary 
policy, which has been in existence in Europe since 1999, has not been affecting all the 
countries equally. Therefore, the European Central Bank should give due consideration 
to the sovereign risk differences between countries in implementing its monetary 
decisions to ensure a smooth transmission of monetary policy through trade credit.  
 This article has tried to shed light on the effect of sovereign risk on trade credit 
and on the transmission of monetary policy through this source of finance. However, 
further analysis is needed to fully understand the role of trade credit and to reduce the 
negative impact of sovereign risk on the financing conditions of firms. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Sample 
PANEL A: NUMBER OF FIRMS PER COUNTRY 
Number of observations Number of firms 
Austria 2,251 455 
Belgium 22,825 3,209 
Finland 6,684 1,027 
France 53,952 8,625 
Germany 29,052 5,358 
Greece 9,799 1,466 
Ireland 1,560 331 
Italy 92,853 13,346 
Luxembourg 687 118 
Netherlands 1,816 313 
Portugal 17,635 3,127 
Spain 57,130 8,489 
Total 296,244 45,864 
PANEL B: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS PER YEAR 
  
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
Total 
Obs. 
N. of 
observations 
 
30,903 
 
31,229 
 
35,663 
 
41,660 
 
42,985 
 
40,975 
 
38,517 
 
34,312 
 
296,244 
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Table 2: Industry breakdown 
 
 
 
 
Industry 
 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
 
Number of 
firms 
 
 
 
Proportion of each industry 
over the whole sample 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
and Hunting 
 
3,430 
 
535 
 
1.17% 
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil 
and Gas Extraction 
 
2,142 
 
346 
 
0.75% 
Utilities 8,226 1,303 2.84% 
Construction 29,163 4,644 10.12% 
Manufacturing 143,923 21,935 47.83% 
Trade 87,337 13,631 29.72% 
Transportation and 
Warehousing 
 
22,023 
 
3,470 
 
7.57% 
Total 296,244 45,864 100% 
 
Table 3: Independent variables 
VARIABLE PROXY 
Sovereign risk (SR) Sovereign bond yield spread of a country relative to Germany 
Monetary policy (∆i) Change in the short-term money market rate 
(∆i*SR) Interaction term between sovereign risk and monetary policy 
Sales growth (ΔSales) (Sales in year t – Sales in year t-1)/Sales in year t-1 
Size (SIZE) Log(Total Assets) 
Liquidity (LIQ) Cash balances/Total Assets 
Inventory (INV) Inventory/Total Assets 
Internal resources (INTRES) Cash flow/Total Assets 
Collateral (COL) Tangible fixed assets/Total Assets 
Bank loans (LOANS) Bank loans/Total Assets 
 
Table 4: Sample statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
TCPAY 0.1629 0.2933 0.0000 76.4414 
TCREC 0.2536 0.6228 0.0000 249.1792 
ΔSALES 0.0103 0.1943 -0.9987 0.9998 
SIZE 10.1242 1.2891 4.6562 19.4047 
LIQ 0.0777 0.1118 0.0000 0.9866 
INV 0.1945 0.1661 0.0000 0.9982 
INTRES 0.0650 0.0881 -0.9992 0.9922 
COL 0.2294 0.1987 0.0000 0.9973 
LOANS 0.1107 0.1403 0.0000 0.9979 
SR 1.1449 2.0613 -0.9398 21.0025 
∆i -0.2747 1.4244 -3.4059 1.1984 
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Table 5: Correlations 
 ΔSALES SIZE LIQ INV INTRES COL LOANS SR ∆i 
ΔSALES 1         
SIZE 0.0632 1        
LIQ 0.0121 -0.0815 1       
INV -0.0025 -0.0484 -0.1520 1      
INTRES 0.1877 -0.0023 0.1740 -0.1343 1     
COL -0.0333 0.0479 -0.1666 -0.2694 0.0966 1    
LOANS -0.0241 -0.0373 -0.2590 0.1864 -0.2260 -0.0109 1   
SR -0.1091 -0.0539 -0.0429 -0.0325 -0.1171 0.0425 0.0925 1  
∆i 0.2687 0.0153 -0.0136 0.0219 0.0566 -0.0451 0.0241 -0.0736 1 
 
 
 
Table 6: Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity 
 
Endogenous variable 
 
Instrument 
Diff-in-Hansen: 
equations in 
differences (p-value) 
Diff-in-Hansen: 
equations in levels  
(p-value) 
∆SALES ΔSALESt – 2  0.000 0.000 
ΔSALESt – 3 0.000 0.005 
ΔSALESt – 4 0.433 0.753 
ΔSALESt – 5 0.071  
ΔSALESt – 6 0.000  
SIZE SIZEt – 2 0.000 0.000 
SIZEt – 3 0.000 0.006 
SIZEt – 4 0.004 0.465 
SIZEt – 5 0.003  
SIZEt – 6 0.070  
LIQ LIQt – 2 0.000 0.000 
LIQt – 3 0.000 0.978 
LIQt – 4 0.474 0.000 
LIQt – 5 0.010  
LIQt – 6 0.000  
INV INVt – 2 0.002 0.326 
INVt – 3 0.002 0.000 
INVt – 4 0.606 0.000 
INVt – 5 0.006  
INVt – 6 0.028  
INTRES INTRESt – 2 0.000 0.024 
INTRESt – 3 0.010 0.008 
INTRESt – 4 0.955 0.279 
INTRESt – 5 0.003  
INTRESt – 6 0.342  
COL COLt – 2 0.000 0.000 
COLt – 3 0.002 0.000 
COLt – 4 0.000 0.323 
COLt – 5 0.174  
COLt – 6 0.202  
LOANS LOANSt – 2 0.000 0.272 
LOANSt – 3 0.001 0.011 
LOANSt – 4 0.015 0.016 
LOANSt – 5 0.748  
LOANSt – 6 0.000  
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Table 7: First-stage OLS regressions and Cragg-Donald statistics for System-GMM estimates 
 F-statistic p-value R2 
Panel A. Dependent variable in levels, explanatory variables (instruments) in differences 
∆SALES 185.1 0.0000 0.1002 
SIZE 599.6 0.0000 0.0566 
LIQ 1,530.2 0.0000 0.1592 
INV 829.5 0.0000 0.2222 
INTRES 181 0.0000 0.1284 
COL 2,029.7 0.0000 0.2047 
LOANS 1,147.8 0.0000 0.1636 
Cragg-Donald statistic: 17.60    
Panel B. Dependent variable in differences, explanatory variables (instruments) in levels 
∆(∆SALES) 171.6 0.0000 0.1662 
∆SIZE 97.9 0.0000 0.1208 
∆LIQ 325.3 0.0000 0.0678 
∆INV 814.3 0.0000 0.0672 
∆INTRES 22.8 0.0000 0.0527 
∆COL 215.4 0.0000 0.0853 
∆LOANS 169.5 0.0000 0.0256 
Cragg-Donald statistic: 3.50    
 
 
Table 8: Results (Dummy variable for sovereign risk (SR)) 
(a) 
Trade credit payables 
(b) 
Trade credit receivables 
SRt  -0.0210 (-2.72) *** -0.0306 (-2.55) ** 
∆it 0.0093 (1.84) * 0.0140 (1.66) * 
∆it *SRt -0.0026 (-1.67) * -0.0052 (-2.45) ** 
∆SALESi,t -0.0096 (-0.47)  -0.0729 (-2.64) *** 
SIZEi,t 0.0088 (0.50)  0.0504 (1.84) * 
LIQi,t 0.0037 (0.05)  -0.3401 (-2.88) *** 
INVi,1 0.0141 (0.22)  -0.1197 (-0.90)  
INTRESi,t 0.1354 (0.95)  0.0533 (0.32)  
COLi,t -0.0390 (-0.78)  -0.1930 (-2.78) *** 
LOANSi,t -0.0019 (-0.02)  -0.1651 (-1.09)  
LR Test. SR 0.0067 (1.36)  0.0088 (1.10)  
Country dummies Yes   Yes   
Year dummies Yes   Yes   
Industry dummies  Yes   Yes   
z1 0.0010   0.0100   
z2 0.0000   0.0000   
z3 0.0000   0.0000   
m2 0.263 0.194   
Hansen 0.471   0.517   
Diff-in-Hansen 0.456 0.543   
Coefficients associated with each variable. In brackets, T-student; *** indicates a level of significance of 0.01, ** 
indicates a level of significance of 0.05, * indicates a level of significance of 0.1. LR Test. SR is the linear restriction 
test of the sum of the coefficients associated with ∆it and ∆it*SRt. z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance 
of the time, country and industry dummies respectively, under the null hypothesis of no relation. m2 is the p-value of 
the 2nd order serial correlation statistic. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as X2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term. Diff-in-
Hansen is also a test distributed as X2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the subset of instruments 
used in the level equations and the error term. 
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Table 9: Results (Continuous variable for sovereign risk (SR)) 
(a) 
Trade credit payables 
(b) 
Trade credit receivables 
SRt  0.0041 (1.21) -0.0110 (-1.85) * 
∆it 0.0136 (2.48) ** 0.0126 (1.72) * 
∆it *SRt -0.0009 (-1.00)  -0.0024 (-1.81) * 
∆SALESi,t 0.0258 (1.48)  -0.0776 (-2.89) *** 
SIZEi,t 0.0024 (0.18)  0.0223 (1.15)  
LIQi,t 0.0127 (0.21)  -0.2456 (-2.24) ** 
INVi,1 0.0110 (0.20)  -0.2795 (-3.37) *** 
INTRESi,t -0.2305 (-1.97) ** -0.2381 (-1.66) * 
COLi,t 0.0342 (0.92)  -0.1321 (-2.20) ** 
LOANSi,t -0.0435 (-0.66)  -0.1403 (-1.16)  
Country dummies Yes   Yes   
Year dummies Yes   Yes   
Industry dummies  Yes   Yes   
z1 0.0000   0.0000   
z2 0.0002   0.0000   
z3 0.0385   0.0000   
m2 0.739 0.121   
Hansen 0.509   0.627   
Diff-in-Hansen 0.538 0.868   
Coefficients associated with each variable. In brackets, T-student; *** indicates a level of significance of 0.01, ** 
indicates a level of significance of 0.05, * indicates a level of significance of 0.1. z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the 
joint significance of the time, country and industry dummies respectively, under the null hypothesis of no relation. m2 
is the p-value of the 2nd order serial correlation statistic. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error 
term. Diff-in-Hansen is also a test distributed as X2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the subset of 
instruments used in the level equations and the error term. 
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Table 10: Results (Continuous variable for sovereign risk (SR) & Structural breaks caused by the crisis) 
(a) 
Trade credit payables 
(b) 
Trade credit receivables 
SRt  0.0026 (0.69) -0.0160 (-2.00) ** 
∆it 0.0106 (2.46) ** 0.0205 (2.30) ** 
∆it *SRt -0.0014 (-1.40)  -0.0034 (-2.11) ** 
SRt* PRECRISISt 3.4635 (2.05) ** 2.4331 (0.73)  
∆SALESi,t 0.0295 (1.80) * -0.0147 (-0.61)  
SIZEi,t 0.0040 (0.38)  0.0134 (0.68)  
LIQi,t -0.0049 (-0.09)  -0.2144 (-1.59)  
INVi,t -0.0027 (-0.06)  -0.2478 (-2.80) *** 
INTRESi,t -0.1949 (-1.98) ** -0.4015 (-2.49) ** 
COLi,t 0.0217 (0.71)  -0.1425 (-2.28) ** 
LOANSi,t 0.0119 (0.23)  -0.0962 (-0.70)  
LR Test. PRECRISIS 3.4661 (2.05) ** 2.4172 (0.72)  
Country dummies Yes   Yes   
Year dummies Yes   Yes   
Industry dummies  Yes   Yes   
z1 0.0004   0.0318   
z2 0.0000   0.0002   
z3 0.0000   0.0000   
m2 0.116 0.962   
Hansen 0.443   0.713   
Diff-in-Hansen 0.432 0.732   
Coefficients associated with each variable. In brackets, T-student; *** indicates a level of significance of 0.01, ** 
indicates a level of significance of 0.05, * indicates a level of significance of 0.1. LR Test. PRECRISIS is the linear 
restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SRt and SRt*PRECRISISt. z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of 
the joint significance of the time, country and industry dummies respectively, under the null hypothesis of no relation. 
m2 is the p-value of the 2nd order serial correlation statistic. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error 
term. Diff-in-Hansen is also a test distributed as X2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the subset of 
instruments used in the level equations and the error term. 
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FIGURES 
Fig. 1: Trade credit vs. loan usage differences across restrictive and expansionary monetary 
regimes 
  67(8998:;8)  
 <=  67(>?@A&B8C)  
     
 
 
 
 
The cost of trade credit (<=) is more stable than the effective cost of bank credit (67(8998:;8)) when monetary 
conditions vary. A firm will switch to trade credit finance when the effective loan price (67(8998:;8))	rises above 
the effective cost of trade credit (<=), which is more likely to occur during monetary restrictions.  
Source: Atanasova and Wilson (2003) 
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Fig. 2. Marginal effect of monetary policy on trade credit 
payables in relation to risk premium when short-term 
money market rate increases. Based on model (a), Table 9. 
Fig. 3. Marginal effect of monetary policy on trade credit 
receivables in relation to risk premium when short-term 
money market rate increases. Based on model (b), Table 9. 
Fig. 4. Marginal effect of monetary policy on trade credit 
payables in relation to risk premium when short-term 
money market rate increases. Based on model (a), Table 10. 
Fig. 5. Marginal effect of monetary policy on trade credit 
receivables in relation to risk premium when short-term 
money market rate increases. Based on model (b), Table 10. 
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TRADE CREDIT, SOVEREIGN RISK AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROPE 
HIGHLIGHTS 
We study how sovereign risk affects trade credit, directly and through monetary policy. 
During the crisis, trade credit supply decreases as sovereign risk increases. 
Trade credit received increases as sovereign risk rises, but only before the crisis. 
Monetary restrictions increase trade credit only in low-moderate sovereign risk countries. 
 
